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A B S T R A C T  
 With the increasing general availability of very high resolution (VHR) satellite 
remote sensing data, issues of potential invasion of personal spheres of privacy will 
become ever more important. As of yet, there is no international law providing for a 
clear-cut regime balancing the freedom of information, including information gathering, 
with the rights of individual persons to remain free from interference with their privacy. 
The latter issues therefore essentially can be tackled only at a national level, with the 
obvious disadvantage that any regulation remains principally limited in scope to the 
national jurisdiction concerned. 
 Also at the European level this essentially holds true, although two separate 
developments are making considerable inroads into this situation. On the one hand, by 
means of the European Convention on Human Rights, which does recognize a human 
right to privacy, an overarching regime has been created that largely limits individual 
member states of the Council of Europe in their discretion to deal with that right as they 
see fit. 
 On the other hand, from a perspective of prevention of undue distortion of the 
Internal Market through major variations in the extent to which (the application of) 
privacy laws might result in obstacles to the free flow of information within the European 
Union, a body of EC law is evolving which harmonizes the applicable laws to a 
considerable extent. 
 This paper analyzes both developments, and represents an effort to relate them to 
each other with a view in particular as to how they might impact satellite remote sensing 
operations, once these would actually come to be seen as infringing personal privacy. Its 
final conclusion is that, indeed, the combination of those two European legal approaches 
to privacy leads to a sensible compromise on handling the potential effects on privacy 
flowing from the ‘resolution revolution’ in satellite remote sensing data. 
 
R É S U M É  
 La disponibilité accrue de données télédétection très haute résolution renforce le 
problème de l'empiètement sur le droit à la vie privée. Jusqu'a maintenant, aucune loi 
internationale n'avait établi de distinction juridique permettant de mettre en balance les 
intérêts concurrents de la liberté de l'accès à l'information et de la collecte d'informations 
avec le droit de l'individu au respect de sa vie privée. Par conséquent, les tribunaux 
devront trouver des solutions aux problèmes juridiques en droit 
domestique, avec pour inconvénient majeur, un champ d'application restreint à celui de 
la loi étatique. 
 Ce problème existe en Europe comme ailleurs, mais la situation tend quelque peu 
à s’éclaircir grâce à deux tendances. Premièrement la Convention européenne des droits 
de l'homme reconnaît le droit à la vie privée, et le régime obligatoire de cette Convention 
limite considérablement la marge de manœuvre des États Membres du Conseil de 
l'Europe dans leur interprétation de ce droit. Deuxièmement, afin d'éviter la distorsion 
du marché interne qui pourrait résulter de l'application de différentes lois domestiques 
sur l'accès à l'information, le droit européen est en train d'harmoniser considérablement 
les règles applicables. 
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 Cet article analyse ces deux développements et tente de discerner la relation entre 
eux, surtout pour déterminer l'effet sur les opérations de télédétection par satellite 
lorsqu'il est établi que ces opérations empiètent sur le droit à la vie privée. La conclusion 
de l'article est que ces deux approches juridiques européennes représentent un compromis 
intéressant pour les effets potentiels sur la vie privée des données télédétection très haute 
résolution. 
 
I. SPACE REMOTE SENSING, PRIVACY 
PROTECTION ISSUES AND THE EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
 
ne of the most important recent global developments in space 
activity is that triggered by the increasing generation of very 
high resolution (VHR) satellite remote sensing data. Its 
worldwide availability, driven by Google Earth and its equivalents (for 
obvious commercial reasons) making crucial use of modern 
telecommunication infrastructure such as the Internet, helps to spur on a 
revolution in satellite imagery and data acquisition. These developments 
manifest themselves in the rapidly increasing possibilities now available 
to individuals to, potentially, monitor and intrude in on other 
individuals' private lives, and the concurrent growing interest of 
commerce in such potential.  
 
 Personally, I received a forewarning of the potential impact of 
such developments a number of years ago when a German businessman 
approached me with his idea to offer certain mementoes for sale to 
tourists leaving the peninsula of Mount Athos, a religious enclave within 
Greece. The mementoes in question concerned satellite pictures of the 
peninsula and its monasteries. He was, however, faced with a refusal by 
the Greek authorities to permit him to sell such mementoes near the 'exit' 
of Mount Athos since the intrusion upon the prevailing religious 
atmosphere as per these 'satellite close-ups' was considered 
unacceptable. He wondered whether such a prohibition was not in 
violation of the freedom of space activities, in particular remote sensing, 
as he understood it to be enshrined within the Outer Space Treaty1 and 
international law.2 
                                                     
1 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), done 27 
January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; 
UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967), in particular Art. I 
which states amongst other things: "Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any 
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law".  
2 In regard of remote sensing, the freedom of using outer space within the limits of 
O 
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 The answer, of course, was both yes: the freedom of remote 
sensing prevented the Greek government from prohibiting the generation 
of those satellite pictures of Mount Athos (at least under international 
law – in other words, as long as the relevant operator was not Greek or 
operating from Greek territory); and no: there was nothing legally 
incorrect with the prohibition imposed by the Greek authorities on the 
distribution such data within Greece, as this was comprehensively 
subsumed under the sovereignty of Greece. As such, Sovereign 
competencies would certainly extend to any efforts to preserve the 
virtual integrity of the monasteries in terms of such intrusion, and to 
consider such rights to virtual integrity more important than relevant 
business interests. 
 
 It therefore seems that while international law positively 
stimulates the worldwide flow of information and data as freely as 
possible, national law is then often called upon to try and preserve the 
interests of individual people or entities to have information and data 
pertaining to them less freely circulated. This dichotomy could only rise 
to pre-eminence with the 'resolution revolution', since this revolution, for 
the first time, spawned data of such high resolution that privacy can 
become fundamentally challenged in the process. In the above instance, 
the privacy was of a larger-than-individual nature - but the next step to 
intrusion in personal privacy is only a small one.3 
 
 As revolutions are wont to do, this one has to some extent started 
to eat its own children. The CEO of Google Earth was not very pleased, 
to put it mildly, when he found his mansion including swimming pool 
and other edifices to be easily and rapidly pointed out on the Internet, 
using Google data. Recently, whether as a consequence of this 'event' or 
not, Google Earth announced its general interest in cooperating with 
relevant authorities to ensure that a correct balance would be struck 
between privacy concerns and any commercial interests involved. This 
expression of interest was clarified as being acceptable only with the 
                                                                                                                       
international law has taken on the particular shape of freedom of information-gathering 
from space and the distribution of such data. This freedom is only marginally limited by 
the provision of Principle XII of the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from 
Outer Space (hereafter Resolution 41/65), UNGA Res. 41/65, of 3 December 1986; UN Doc. 
A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, at 43; 25 ILM 1334 (1986); that "As soon as the primary data and the 
processed data concerning the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed 
State shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost 
terms". 
3 See e.g. R. Purdy, 'Satellites: A New Era for Environmental Compliance', (2006) 3:5 
Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law, 407-8; 412-3.  
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least possible interference with opportunities to generate, distribute and 
use relevant data.  
 
 Regardless of these Google Earth-centered events, it will be clear 
that the underlying developments in this area do draw issues of the 
protection of privacy of individuals into the picture. This paper 
addresses the issue from a particular European vantage point because, in 
Europe, the dichotomy between international law and national law is to 
some extent bridged by legal developments at an intermediate level. 
 
 In this respect, it is important to note that when it comes to 
'European legal approaches' to privacy protection in law, and their 
potential or actual impact upon space-based remote sensing activities, 
one should look elsewhere than space lawyers would perhaps, at first 
instance, be inclined to do. The 'Europe' in question is not that of the 
European Space Agency (ESA), as this is an intergovernmental 
organization created to pool the financial and technical resources of its 
member states for the purpose of space activities, and which does not 
seek to exercise any legal or regulatory control over such space activities, 
whether public or private.4 Neither is it the 'Europe' of EUTELSAT5 (even 
                                                     
4 ESA was established by means of the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space 
Agency, Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 14 ILM 864 (1975), 
which lists, in Art. II, as the primary objectives of such establishment: "to provide for and to 
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space 
research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for 
scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems, (a) by elaborating and 
implementing a long-term European space policy, by recommending space objectives to 
the Member States, and by concerting the policies of the Member States with respect to 
other national and international organizations and institutions; (b) by elaborating and 
implementing activities and programmes in the space field; (c) by coordinating the 
European space programme and national programmes, and by integrating the latter 
progressively and as completely as possible into the European space programme, in 
particular as regards the development of applications satellites; (d) by elaborating and 
implementing the industrial policy appropriate to its programme and by recommending a 
coherent industrial policy to the Member States". 
5 EUTELSAT was originally established as an intergovernmental organization by means of 
the Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), 
Paris, done 15 July 1982, entered into force 1 September 1985; Cmnd. 9069; Space Law – Basic 
Legal Documents, C.II.1; for the purposes of "the design, development, construction, 
establishment, operation and maintenance of the space segment of the European 
telecommunications satellite system or systems. In this context, EUTELSAT shall have as its 
prime objective the provision of the space segment required for international public 
telecommunications services in Europe" (Art. III (a)). Meanwhile, EUTELSAT operations 
have been commercialised, with a private operator Eutelsat being responsible for day-to-
day management, operations, marketing and sales; cf. also Convention Establishing the 
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), done 15 July 1982, entered 
into force 1 September 1985, as amended 20 May 1999, amended version not yet entered 
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before its recent privatization) as that organization essentially took over 
European satellite communication infrastructure; or even of 
EUMETSAT,6 which did the same for satellite-based meteorology. The 
'Europe' that needs to concern us here is that of, on the one hand, the 
Council of Europe, and, on the other hand, the European Community as 
it constitutes the legally relevant part of the European Union. 
 
II. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND PRIVACY: THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
 
 The Council of Europe is one of the oldest intergovernmental 
organizations in Europe that sprung from the general desire to steer 
away from the horrors of the Second World War. It was to establish an 
international framework integrating several aspects of the member 
states' national legal orders in order to ban the nationalism and 
xenophobia largely considered responsible for those horrors. Its magnum 
opus was the European Convention on Human Rights,7 serving as a 
catalogue of fundamental human rights to counter any tendency to 
permit the resurgence of such horrors.  
 
 The Council of Europe itself was established by means of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe, drafted in 1949.8 Currently, it comprises 
47 member states,9 and is thus considerably broader in terms of 
membership than the European Union. All members of the Council of 
Europe as a consequence of their membership automatically became 
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
 In the context of the Council of Europe, privacy has been logically 
                                                                                                                       
into force but applied provisionally 2 July 2001; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, C.II.1. 
6 The intergovernmental organization EUMETSAT was established by means of the 
Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), Geneva, done 24 May 1983, entered into force 19 
June 1986; as amended 14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July 1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law 
– Basic Legal Documents, C.III.1; 44 ZLW 68 (1995); in order "to establish, maintain and 
exploit European systems of operational meteorological satellites, taking into account as far 
as possible the recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization. A further 
objective of EUMETSAT is to contribute to the operational monitoring of the climate and 
the detection of global climatic changes" (Art. 2(1)). 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, done 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953; ETS No. 005. [European Convention on 
Human Rights].  
8 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, done 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 
1949; ETS No. 001.  
9 See online: <http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe>. At the time of writing, there is 
one applicant state as well as five observer states. 
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approached and is treated, first and foremost, as a (rather fundamental) 
human right. The principle does not attempt a balancing act between an 
individual interest to remain free from intrusion and other (commercial) 
interests in the widespread distribution and availability of personal and 
personalized information. 
 
 To be precise, such a legal approach was not an exclusively 
European one. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights,10 
drafted in the UN context for more or less the same purposes and with 
more or less the same approach, had included an Article 12 which 
prohibited any arbitrary interference with privacy and called for its 
protection by instruments of national (as well as international) law.11 
 
 The Universal Declaration was not a treaty with binding legal 
force, although its high political and moral status, as well as the obvious 
concerns for humanity behind it, caused it to be viewed by many as 
representing, in many respects, customary international law and, in 
some respects, even as jus cogens.12 Most of the Declaration's principles 
were later elaborated upon in an international convention, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17 of this 
Covenant, addressing the right to privacy, essentially replicates the 
analogous provision in the Universal Declaration.13 
 
 Developments in Europe, however, were considerably more rapid, 
as the European Convention on Human Rights was drafted as early as 
1950, and was already in force in 1953. The Convention elaborated upon 
the succinct statement of the human right to privacy in the Universal 
Declaration. Article 8(1) posited the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence, and Article 8(2) spelt out that 
interference with the right to privacy by public authorities was 
                                                     
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, UN GA Res. 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948; 
A/RES/217. 
11 Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, reads in full: "No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks."  
12 See Art. 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, done 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980; 1155 UNTS 331; UKTS 1980 No. 58; Cmnd. 4818; ATS 1974 No. 2; 8 
ILM 679 (1969). 
13 Art. 17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, done 19 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976; 6 ILM 368 (1967); reads in full: "1. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." 
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permissible only in exceptional cases. Moreover, these exceptional 
circumstances ought to be clearly outlined by the relevant national law 
and exercised within the limits of such provisions. Such an approach was 
of far greater precision than the Universal Declaration.14 
 
 Thus, whilst Article 12 of the Universal Declaration served as a 
precursor to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
considerable differences exist.15 By way of an example further to the one 
above, the European Convention does not expressly prohibit attacks on 
honor and reputation, which the Universal Declaration by contrast does. 
At the same time, the rights concerned are general and broad in scope, 
and whilst the European Convention did not seek to provide exhaustive 
definitions, interpretations were subsequently developed in case law, in 
particular in the Pretty case.16 
 
 Also, the European Convention narrows down the scope of the 
prohibition of interference to such interference by "public authority" 
only.17 In other words: if the distribution of satellite data potentially 
interfering with a person's privacy is carried out by a non-governmental 
entity – for example a private entity acting for commercial reasons – no 
violation of Article 8 would arise.  
 
 Essentially, this is where a 'paparazzi-problem' arises. The right to 
recognition of privacy, expressed in Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention, applies across the board. However, the specific prohibition 
on interference with such privacy under Article 8(2) only applies to 
governmental action, a prohibition limited furthermore by specifically 
carved-out exceptions. In case relevant interference with privacy occurs 
by private action, it would ultimately be up to the judge or court of the 
concerned jurisdiction to decide whether the interference with the right 
                                                     
14 The full text of Article 8 runs as follows: "(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference 
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others."  
15 See further in detail J. Velu, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right 
to Respect for Private Life, the Home and Communications" in A.H. Robertson ed., Privacy 
and Human Rights, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973) 14. [Velu]. 
16 Pretty v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 2346/02, Judgment of 29 April 2002) 
[Pretty]; see further P. van Dijk et al, Eds., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 4th ed., (Oxford/Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006) 664-5. [Van Dijk]. 
17 See also Velu, supra note 15 at 17, pointing out that this limitation was a result of a British 
amendment to the Article, which was partially accepted.  
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would amount to a violation of the law. This situation might arise, for 
example, because there is no justification for that interference in terms of 
consent of the targeted individual or the violation on regulations of 
freedom of information gathering. The intention and focus of the 
European Convention is unequivocally focused on controlling 
impersonal governmental bureaucracies and precluding them from 
unfettered 'Big-Brothering', not on private or commercial intrusions.18 
 
 At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights has 
developed the concept of 'positive obligations', which turns the 
obligation of the governmental authorities from one of merely refraining 
from violating privacy rights into an active duty to protect those rights of 
individuals. This, therefore, extends the protection to individuals against 
private third parties.19 
 
 This is, however, only the status at the European level. In the case 
of Mount Athos, clearly the Greek authorities protected the privacy of 
the monasteries and surrounding areas over an individual's right of free 
information gathering. However, that is indeed a matter to be decided 
upon at the national level – other states might have decided differently 
in comparable circumstances, either in terms of national laws or statutes, 
or in terms of court decisions in case of actual disputes. 
 
 A further point of note concerns the scope of "everyone", as the 
subject entitled to the rights of Article 8(1): does it include juridical 
persons?20 Drafted so as to address natural persons only, originally 
considerable uncertainty existed as to whether it could nevertheless be 
interpreted to apply to juridical persons as well. However, with the 2002 
Colas Est case, that question has been settled with an affirmative 
answer.21 As such, companies, whose right to 'privacy' would be violated 
by VHR satellite data, might – if falling otherwise within the scope of the 
European Convention of course – base a relevant claim upon Article 8. 
 
 Finally, questions could still arise as to the scope of the notions of 
'privacy' and 'interference' therewith, specifically also as to the role 
satellite data could play in this context. 
 
 Prosser's Law of Torts, for example, lists four categories of relevant 
                                                     
18 See further also Velu, supra note 15 at 20-3, 87-91.  
19 See Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 739-45.  
20 See Velu, supra note 15 at 18-20.  
21 Colas Est  v. France (Application nr. 37971/97, Judgment of 16 April 2002).  
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interference: (1) intrusion on plaintiff's privacy; (2) public disclosure of 
private facts; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
and, (4) appropriation of some elements of the plaintiff's personality for 
the defendant's advantage.22 
 
 It seems that (1) and (2) would be at issue in the case of VHR 
satellite data: those data could well intrude upon any privacy as long as 
they concern open air activities, and could similarly be disclosed to the 
public fairly easily. Many VHR satellite data applications are of a 
commercial character, making their providers interested in spreading 
them in principle as widely and as easily as possible. In addition, it could 
be imagined that cases might fall within category (3), in particular when 
satellite data might be tampered with. 
 
 In May 1967, considering the right to privacy, the Nordic 
Conference of Jurists arrived at a wider definition as follows:23 
 
The right of the individual to lead his own life protected against: 
(a) Interference with his private, family and home life. (b) 
Interference with his physical or mental integrity or his moral or 
intellectual freedom. (c) Attacks on his honour and reputation. (d) 
Being placed in a false light. (e) The disclosure of irrelevant, 
embarrassing facts relating to his private life. (f) The use of his 
name, identity or likeness. (g) Spying, prying, watching and 
besetting. (h) Interference with his correspondence. (i) Misuse of 
his private communications, written or oral. (j) Disclosure of 
information given or received by him in circumstances of 
professional confidence.  
 
 From the perspective of VHR satellite data, more or less similar to 
the case of Prosser's abovementioned definition, categories (a) and (e) 
clearly apply, at least in principle. In addition, category (g), absent as a 
specific category in Prosser's definition, should be noted: this category 
includes persistent watching of a person, photographing and filming, 
eavesdropping and recording. Subject to limited exceptions relating to 
consent of the targeted individual or any public nature or function in 
which the target was active,24 this category would include cases where 
                                                     
22 As discussed in Velu, supra note 15 at 32-3. 
23 As quoted in Velu, supra note 15 at 33.  
24 See Velu, supra note 15 at 51-58. Exceptions regarding the target's consent, it may be 
noted, may lead to additional problems of interpretation in the context of satellite data, as 
in most cases the target will not be aware that  a satellite is generating data of potential 
particular concern to him. 
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fundamental use is made of observation satellites. 
 
 As indicated above, no exhaustive authoritative list of activities, 
scenarios or situations has been developed for the definition of 'private 
life', the phrase within Article 8 most relevant in the context of VHR 
satellite data. The closest to such a list came in the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Pretty case:25  
  
As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of 
"private life" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a 
person . . . . It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's 
physical and social identity . . . . Elements such as, for example, 
gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life 
fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 . . . . Article 8 
also protects a right to personal development, and the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and 
the outside world . . . . Although no previous case has established 
as such any right to self-determination as being contained in 
Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of 
personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees.  
 
 One authoritative expert text interprets this to mean that Article 8 
contains "various guarantees to personal autonomy, personal privacy, 
personal identity, personal integrity, personal development, personal 
identification and similar concepts linked to the individual notion of 
personhood".26 
 
 In any event, "the registration of personal data has been a vital 
issue of the notion of privacy" – a conclusion of clear relevance for VHR 
satellite data.27 The obligations under Article 8, however, seem to be 
indeed directed largely to governmental authorities (such as in the 
medical field), although sometimes private institutions of a specific non-
commercial nature could also become involved.28 
 
 A second notion of potential relevance for activities involving 
VHR satellite data concerns the respect for the home and protection 
                                                     
25 Pretty, supra note 16 at § 61.  
26 Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 665.  
27 Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 666; see also 667-79 for further analysis.  
28 See also Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 667-77.  
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against nuisance, which "also include those [violations of the right] that 
are not concrete or physical, such as . . . other forms of interference".29 
The right, in particular in VHR-data related circumstances, may actually 
be difficult to distinguish from the right to private life.30 Still, it has 
apparently not been made clear so far whether virtual interference with 
the right, 'spying' as such (that is without further concrete nuisance 
resulting from such spying, for example a publication on the web of the 
VHR data concerned) would already constitute a violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention. 
 
 Finally, it should be noted that the rights offered by Article 8 of the 
European Convention are not unlimited.31 Specific limitations are 
already offered by the Convention itself, referring to "time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation",32 "the political 
activity of aliens",33 as well as national security, public safety and other 
exceptions explicitly provided for by Article 8. 
 
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND PRIVACY: 
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
 
 In quite clear contrast to the Council of Europe and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Community ultimately 
became involved in privacy protection issues from an economic 
perspective. This is ultimately not surprising since the Community had 
originated from the need for general economic integration of the member 
states by means of regulation, even if the scope of involvement of the 
European authorities and EC law has, over the decades, extended so as 
to encompass many areas not of a (purely) economic nature.  
 
 It became apparent that the application of privacy protection could 
often impact negatively upon economic activities.  
 
 Without trying to sum up the comprehensive legislative 
development of the EC legal order here, it may be helpful to reiterate the 
official aims of the European Community, then Union, as they were 
defined by Article 2 of the EC Treaty,34 in order to assess the potential for 
                                                     
29 Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 719.  
30 See also Van Dijk, supra note 16 at 723.  
31 See especially Velu, supra note 15 at 66-87.  
32 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15(1). 
33 European Convention on Human Rights, Art, 16. 
34 The EC Treaty is essentially the original Treaty of Rome, or Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, Rome, done 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 January 1958; 298 UNTS 
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privacy issues to come within the scope of that Treaty's regime. Such 
aims and objectives include: the development of the EC economy; a high 
level of employment and social protection; a high level of environmental 
protection; the enhancement of the standard of living throughout the 
member states; and the economic and social cohesion of the Community 
and its member states.35 
 
 The consequence of an absence of a reference to 'privacy' in the EC 
Treaty (or any other part of primary EC law) is that EC law only 
interferes once privacy protection or, in a wider sense, privacy issues, 
would have a certain negative impact on economic activities. If such a 
negative impact is determined to exist, the EC authorities – the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council in a complicated interplay 
of roles, responsibilities and competencies in the creation of EC law – can 
come up with the necessary Regulations, Directives and/or Decisions to 
curb such negative impacts. Such an Internal Market-perspective has 
caused EC legislative activities over the decades to be particularly 
focused on three areas.36 
 
 The first area concerns the realization of the so-called four 
freedoms of cross-border movement: of goods (products),37 persons (as 
far as they are involved in economic activities and, for that purpose, 
                                                                                                                       
11; as it was fundamentally amended by the Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, done 7 
February 1992, entered into force 1 November 1993; 31 ILM 247 (1992); OJ C 191/1 (1992). The 
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam), Amsterdam, 
done 2 October 1997, entered into force 1 May 1999; OJ C 340/73 (1997); then inter alia resulted 
in a major renumbering exercise; the numbering of Articles in the present contribution is the 
one following that renumbering. [EC Treaty]. 
35 Art. 2 EC, (that is in its version as per the Treaty of Amsterdam) reads in full: "The 
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and 
monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 
3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, 
equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree 
of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living 
and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States."  
36 From an overarching perspective, a fourth area has traditionally been that of 'external 
competence', i.e. the possibility at the European level to override individual member state 
actions vis-à-vis third states, in terms of regulating or deregulating trade and other 
economic relations with such third states. From the perspective of the current contribution, 
however, this area does not need much attention at this point in time. 
37 EC Treaty, Art. 23.  
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interested in moving across intra-EU borders),38 services39 and capital.40 
From a privacy perspective, the protection thereof could be seen to 
potentially interfere with all four freedoms. From a remote sensing 
perspective, it would largely depend on whether one considers remote 
sensing and the provision of remote sensing information to be a service 
or to be about delivery of a product (a dataset, for example).  
 
 In practice, where remote sensing is considered to amount to a 
service, EC law may require EU member states to allow the providers of 
such services, irrespective of their nationality, to offer them in their 
respective territories on the same condition as home-grown providers 
would do. Mutatis mutandis, if remote sensing is essentially about the 
production of 'goods' such as datasets, then EC law might operate so as 
to ensure the free movement of such goods across intra-EU borders. In 
either case, it is not the activity in outer space or the production of 
datasets as such which would be the subject of the Community's legal 
attention, only downstream aspects within the Community itself. In 
either case, also, it is in this context that EC law might also come to 
interfere with the protection of privacy. 
 
 A second, much more focused area of EC law concerns what is 
commonly referred to as the 'competition' or 'anti-trust' regime, the 
essence of which is to try and ensure a level playing field for private 
companies throughout the European Union by means of dedicated 
instruments curbing anti-competitive behavior. These instruments are 
basically of a twofold nature.  
 
 One set is addressed directly at private undertakings, for example 
prohibiting market strategy coordination ('cartels' or 'collusive conduct' 
as it is now labeled), to the extent that such coordination would have a 
substantive negative effect on this EU-wide level playing field.41 
Moreover, this set of rules seeks to outlaw the abuse of a dominant 
position (such as a monopoly) that a particular private company may 
have for anti-competitive purposes.42  
 
 The other set is addressed to member states, to the extent that they 
might wish to provide state aid to (private) undertakings in order to 
favor certain undertakings over others, and hence distort the proper 
                                                     
38 EC Treaty, Art. 39.   
39 EC Treaty, Art. 49.  
40 EC Treaty, Art. 56.   
41 EC Treaty Art. 81.  
42 EC Treaty Art. 82.  
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functioning of the Internal Market.43 
 
 From the perspective of privacy, it could perhaps be expected that 
as soon as laws or regulations enunciated by national authorities dealing 
with the protection of personal data would result in a distortion of free 
competition and the level playing field, such instruments of competition 
law could be called upon to remedy that distortion. However, upon 
closer view, this only plays at the level of national legislation of member 
states. Thus, in reality, the envisaged Internal Market consists of various 
national markets fenced off by major differences in levels of protection.  
 
 This brings us to the third area of EC law which seeks to address 
privacy concerns: harmonization of national laws to make sure that both 
private companies and private persons are provided or entitled to 
roughly the same level of protection throughout the Union. In fact, a 
considerable degree of legislation has been created under this heading to 
address the matter. 
 
 From the EU perspective, the internal and fundamental objectives 
of the European Union will necessarily lead to a substantial increase in 
cross-border flows of personal data. The main issue underlying 
legislative actions at the EC level with respect to the protection of data 
for privacy protection purposes is that such data may, on the one hand, 
become available to the public (which is in line with the general goals 
and purposes of EU policies regarding free trade and open and fair 
competition) but, on the other hand, they may interfere with the right to 
privacy - which is also a general principle of law acknowledged and 
respected in EC law. Thus, the legal discussion focuses on the balance 
between free provision and movement of information on the one hand 
and the protection privacy rights on the other.  
 
 As long as space-borne data are to be considered as data 
impinging on a person's privacy, the main question for satellite remote 
sensing is to what extent further generation, processing, handling and 
distribution of those data that may result in public accessibility would be 
lawful.  
 
                                                     
43 EC Treaty Art. 87.  
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IV. THE BASELINE REGIME FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 
 
A. THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: SCOPE, OBJECTIVES 
AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 The first major result of the drive within the Community to 
harmonize the national regimes regarding privacy and data protection 
where the absence of such harmonization might interfere with the 
proper functioning of the Internal Market was Directive 95/46/EC of 
October 1995, also known as the Data Protection Directive.44 The 
approach of this central piece of Community-legislation makes it clear 
that the issues concerned are addressed very much from the traditional 
EC-angle: "the Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal 
data . . . in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Community law".45 
 
 The objectives of Directive 95/46 are, firstly, that EU member 
states shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular, their right to privacy with respect to the 
processing of personal data.46 Secondly, member states shall neither 
restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between member 
states merely out of an interest to afford protection as envisaged under 
the Directive's regime.47 In other words: privacy arguments may not be 
(ab)used to distort the functioning of the EU Internal Market. 
 
 Currently, EU member states do not offer the same "level of 
protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably the right to 
privacy".48 This aspect may prevent "the transmission of personal data 
from the territory of a Member State to that of another Member State"; a 
difference which may "therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a 
number of economic activities at Community level, distort competition 
and impede authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under 
Community law".49 
 
                                                     
44 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
[1995] O.J. L 281/31. [Directive 95/46]. 
45 Ibid., at Art. 3(2).  
46 Ibid., at Art. 1(1).  
47 Ibid., at Art. 1(2).  
48 Ibid., at Recital 7.  
49 Ibid., at Recital 7. 
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 The overarching aim of Directive 95/46 is thus to promote 
equivalent levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals 
among member states. This allows safe cross-border flow of personal 
data in parallel with equivalent and safe levels of protection of privacy 
rights. Approximation of national laws is ensured in the Directive, but 
member states are left some margin for maneuver, being able to specify 
in their national law the general conditions governing the lawfulness of 
data processing. 
 
 The principle of protection must be reflected in the obligations 
imposed on persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies or other 
bodies responsible for processing, in particular regarding data quality, 
technical security, notification to the supervisory authority, and the 
circumstances under which processing can be carried out.  
 
 With a view to investigating to what extent satellite-derived data 
might fall within the scope of the EC regime outlined above, reference 
should be had next to the rather all-encompassing definitions of eight 
key concepts and terms. These concepts concern the application of the 
Directive, as well as that of further EC legal documents, as they indicate 
the general approach and scope of the regime concerned.  
 
 These key concepts are defined as follows:50 
 
(a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person hereinafter referred to as 
'data subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his or her physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity; 
(b) 'processing of personal data' hereinafter referred to as 
'processing' shall mean any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction; 
(c) 'personal data filing system' hereinafter referred to as 'filing 
                                                     
50 Ibid., at Art. 2. It may be noted that the exact same definitions reappear in one of the 
follow-up EC-law documents; see EC Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
45/2001/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] O.J. L 8/1 at 
Art. 2. [Regulation 45/2001]. 
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system' shall mean any structured set of personal data which are 
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, 
decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis; 
(d) 'controller' shall mean the Community institution or body, the 
Directorate-General, the unit or any other organisational entity 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and 
means of processing are determined by a specific Community act, 
the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be 
designated by such Community act; 
(e) 'processor' shall mean a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data 
on behalf of the controller; 
(f) 'third party' shall mean a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or body other than the data subject, the 
controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct 
authority of the controller or the processor, are authorised to 
process the data; 
(g) 'recipient' shall mean a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body to whom data are disclosed, 
whether a third party or not; however, authorities which may 
receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry shall not be 
regarded as recipients; 
(h) 'the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific 
and informed indication of his or her wishes by which the data 
subject signifies his or her agreement to personal data relating to 
him or her being processed. 
 
 From a practical point of view, a provider of satellite-derived 
products and/or services would be most analogous to the 'controller' or 
the 'processor' under the Directive's terms. Such a controller or processor 
can be any "natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other 
body".51 The, generally speaking, broad definitions of 'personal data' and 
'processing of personal data' leave ample room for VHR satellite data to 
be included, and hence subjected to the regime of the Data Protection 
Directive. 
 
B. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE DATA 
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE ON DATA HANDLING 
 
 The Directive thus envisages data in a very wide sense. Given the 
                                                     
51 Directive 95/46, Art. 2(d). 
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developments under way, in the framework of the information society, 
of increasingly refined techniques used to capture, transmit, manipulate, 
record, store or communicate sounds and image data relating to natural 
persons, the Directive should be applicable in principle to any processing 
activities involving any such satellite data. The Directive shall therefore 
also apply to any processing of remote sensing data, whether automatic 
or in order to form part of a filing system, as long as a service provider 
can access the positioning and navigation data. However, such 
processing is then subjected to a number of requirements in order to be 
lawful under the Directive:52 personal data must be: 
 
! processed fairly and lawfully; 
! collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical 
or scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that member states provide 
appropriate safeguards; 
! adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed; 
! accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for 
which they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified; 
! kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects 
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which 
the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed. Member states shall lay down appropriate 
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for 
historical, statistical or scientific use." 
 
 In addition:53  
  
 Personal data may be processed only if: 
! the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or 
! processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at 
the request of the data subject prior to entering into a 
                                                     
52 Ibid., at Art. 6(2).  
53 Ibid., at Art. 7.  
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contract; or 
! processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject; or 
! processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests 
of the data subject; or 
! processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried 
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to 
whom the data are disclosed; or 
! processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or 
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1(1). 
 
 Additionally, a distinction is provided between cases of collection 
of data from the data subject, dealt with by Article 10, and cases where 
the data have not been obtained from the data subject, which is usually 
the relevant scenario for satellite data, especially if the satellite data is 
not enhanced, validated and/or verified by terrestrial data and 
information collection. In such cases:54 
 
the controller or his representative must at the time of undertaking 
the recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is 
envisaged, no later than the time when the data are first disclosed 
provide the data subject with at least the following information, 
except where he already has it: 
1. the identity of the controller and of his representative, if 
any; 
2. the purposes of the processing; 
3. any further information such as 
! the categories of data concerned, 
! the recipients or categories of recipients, 
! the existence of the right of access to and the 
right to rectify the data concerning him 
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to 
the specific circumstances in which the data are processed, to 
guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject. 
 
 Further clauses then deal with the actual security of processing 
                                                     
54 Ibid., at Art. 11(1).  
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personal data with potentially privacy-sensitive impacts, such as the 
implementation of appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
protect the data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, and against all other 
unlawful forms of processing. Moreover, it establishes an obligation for 
the data controller to provide sufficient guarantees in respect of such 
technical security measures and organizational measures governing the 
processing to be carried out, and to ensure compliance with those 
measures.55 
 
 Furthermore, when a processor is involved, the activities should 
be regulated by a contract or legal act binding the processor to the 
controller, stipulating in particular that: 
  
the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller, and 
relevant obligations, as defined by the law of the EU member state 
in which the processor is established, shall also be incumbent on 
the processor'.56 
 
 The Directive applies to "the processing of personal data wholly or 
partly by automatic means and to the processing otherwise than by 
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or 
are intended to form part of a filing system".57 This is done "so as to 
permit easy access to the personal data in question".58 
 
 However, there are a few exceptions limiting such comprehensive 
application. Directive 95/46 provides for some prohibited categories of 
data processing, listed as covering "data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life".59 
Satellite data somehow giving away someone's position are not included 
in this list merely for that reason, generally speaking, VHR satellite data 
will not fall within the above prohibited categories. 
 
 One further relevant exception here concerns data processing for 
statistical, historical or scientific purposes.60 Such data are offered no 
protection under the Directive in terms of limiting or prohibiting access 
                                                     
55 Ibid., at Art. 17(1) & (2). 
56 Ibid., at Art. 17(3).  
57 Ibid., at Art. 3(1).  
58 Ibid., at Recital 15. 
59 Ibid., at Art. 8(1).  
60 Ibid., at Art. 11(2).  
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to them, subject to some guarantees ensuring a proper and balanced 
application of this clause. 
 
 Furthermore, according to its own terms, "the Directive shall not 
apply to the processing of personal data . . . in the course of an activity 
which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided 
for by Title V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to 
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security 
(including the economic well-being of the State when the processing 
operation related to State security matters) and the activities of the State 
in areas of criminal law", by a natural person in the course of a purely 
personal or household activity.61 Such data does not enjoy the protection 
offered by the Directive either. 
 
 These exceptions for public security, defence, state security and 
criminal law-related activities are noteworthy as they provide a major 
caveat to the application of the Directive's regime to the remote sensing 
environment. Thus, for example, the processing of satellite data, even if 
'personal' in the sense of the Data Protection Directive, does not fall 
within the scope of the Directive where such processing relates to state 
security matters.  
 
 This exception may have a particular impact on VHR satellite data 
processing as many such data will result from activities conducted for 
purposes of public safety, defence or state security. This, obviously, 
would have to be clearly indicated, and this clause ought to be 
interpreted in a manner which avoids abuse of its potential application. 
 
 To be precise however, the consequence of this provision is not 
that no restrictions protecting privacy interests apply in this context, but 
rather that all and any such restrictions are still basically imposed by 
national legislation and for domestic purposes (and at a more general 
level by international and European human rights law).  
 
 Thus, Directive 95/46 provides the baseline regime for dealing 
with privacy issues within the European Union and its EC law 
framework. The Directive itself directly refers to the relevant internal 
and fundamental objectives of the European Union:62  
 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, 
                                                     
61 Ibid., at Art. 3(2). 
62 Ibid., at Recital 1. 
2009 EUROPE AND THE 'RESOLUTION REVOLUTION': EUROPEAN LEGAL APPROACHES 831 
TO PRIVACY AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR SPACE REMOTE SENSING 
 
fostering closer relations between the States belonging to the 
Community, ensuring economic and social progress by common 
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, encouraging 
the constant improvement of the living conditions of its peoples, 
preserving and strengthening peace and liberty and promoting 
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognised in the 
constitution and laws of the Member States and in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
 
 That baseline was soon seen to require specific elaboration in three 
particular areas: (1) where EU institutions themselves would come to 
play a key role in the process of data generation, gathering, processing 
and/or dissemination; (2) to the extent telecommunications 
infrastructure would present the logical means for distribution and 
dissemination also of satellite data with potential privacy-sensitive 
effects; and (3) the extent to which the substance of the EC law regime 
could and/or should be effectively transported outside the Union in 
order to protect the interests of the whole legal framework within the 
Union. 
 
V. THE ELABORATIONS: EU INSTITUTIONS, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND EXTRA-EU 
EFFECTS 
 
A. REGULATION 45/2001 – EU INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN 
DATA HANDLING 
 
 Regulation 45/200163 essentially applies, and where necessary 
adapts, the regime of Directive 95/46 to the main organs and bodies of 
the European Community and European Union itself. Thus, its scope is 
to "provide the individual with legally enforceable rights to specify the 
data processing obligations of the controllers within the Community 
institutions and bodies and to create an independent supervisory 
authority responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data by 
the Community institutions and bodies".64 
 
 The role and responsibilities of the controller as determined by 
Directive 95/46 shall therefore, as a consequence of Regulation 45/2001, 
also apply to EU institutions and bodies. The "controller shall mean the 
                                                     
63 Regulation 45/2001, supra note 51.  
64 Ibid., at Recital 5. 
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Community institution or body, the Directorate-General, the unit or any 
other organizational entity which alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the 
purposes and means of processing are determined by a specific 
Community act, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination 
may be designated by such Community act".65 
 
 The most important difference to Directive 95/46 is embodied in 
the clauses on the lawfulness of processing, making data processing 
legitimate only as far as:66 
 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest on the basis of the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or other legal instruments adopted on the basis 
thereof or in the legitimate exercise of official authority vested in 
the Community institution or body or in a third party to whom the 
data are disclosed, or . . . necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject, or to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract, or 
[when] the data subject has unambiguously given his or her 
consent, or . . . necessary in order to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject. 
 
 Transfer of personal data – whether within or between EU 
institutions or bodies, or to recipients, other than EU institutions or 
bodies, subject to Directive 95/46, or to recipients, other than EU 
institutions or bodies, which are not subject to Directive 95/46 – in 
principle shall be legitimate as long as carried out in the public interest.  
 
 While prima facie it is unlikely that EU institutions would be 
crucially involved in data handling operations themselves, the recent 
arrival on the space scene of the Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security initiative (GMES) (recently re-christened Kopernikus) may 
change that very soon. 
 
 In November 2001, an EU Council Resolution called for the 
European Commission to coordinate with ESA to develop "an 
operational and autonomous European capability for global monitoring 
for environment and security" by 2008, crucially involving a satellite 
                                                     
65 Ibid., at Art. 2(d). 
66 Ibid., at Art. 5, 
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system.67 This capability was to result in an infrastructure of 
interoperability, with standardized databases being filled with relevant 
data. These data would be partly self-generated by the key GMES 
players, notably ESA and EUMETSAT, with EUMETSAT being 
considered another major stakeholder even though not, to date, an 
'official' partner in the project. 
 
 However, the details of the institutional and governance structure 
to be established at the core of the GMES/Kopernikus initiative remain 
subject to discussion. At some point the establishment of a core entity, 
provisionally labeled 'GMES Authority', must be envisaged. The extent 
to which existing legal rules on privacy protection under Regulation 
45/2001 would apply in the GMES/Kopernikus context depends to a 
considerable extent on the legal character and personality of such a 
GMES Authority (or similar body or bodies). A number of options have 
already entered the debate on this issue, generally referring to various 
types of bodies or organs that can be established under EC law such as a 
Joint Undertaking,68 an Executive Agency,69 a Community Agency70 or a 
Joint Technology Initiative (JTI).71  
                                                     
67 EC, Council Resolution on the launch of the initial period of global monitoring for 
environment and security (GMES) [2001] O.J. C 350/4 at para (3). See further EC, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): Establishing a GMES capacity by 
2008, [2004] COM(2004) 65;. See e.g. Frans G. von der Dunk, 'The 'S' of 'Security': Europe on 
the Road to GMES' (2007) 4-2 Soochow Law Journal  at 1. 
68 EC Treaty Art. 171. See e.g. Communication of 3 February 2004, 17. The example usually 
referred to, of course, is the Galileo Joint Undertaking that paved the way for the Galileo 
development, deployment and operational phases.  
69 EC, Council Regulation 58/2003/EC laying down the status for executive agencies to be 
entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes [2002] O.J. L 
11/1; See also EC, Commission Decision 2004/20/EC setting up an executive agency, the 
'Intelligent Energy Executive Agency', to manage Community action in the field of energy 
in application of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 [2004] O.J. L 5/85; EC, Commission 
Decision 2004/858/EC setting up an executive agency, the 'Executive Agency for the Public 
Health Programme', for the management of Community action in the field of public health 
– pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, [2004] O.J. L 369/73.  
70 See e.g. European Environment Agency (EEA), established by EC, Council Regulation 
1210/90/EEC on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the 
European Environment Information and Observation Network, [1990] O.J. L 120/1;  
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), established by Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 1592/2002/EC on common rules in the field of civil aviation 
and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, [2002] O.J. L 240/1; European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), established by Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council 1406/2002/EC establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, [2002] 
O.J. L 208/1.  
71 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
European Space Policy – Preliminary Elements, SEC(2005)664, Brussels, 23 May 2005, 
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 Whilst other options – such as creating an altogether new 
intergovernmental organization for the purpose – have also been 
considered, the aforementioned options would utilize an EU institution 
and, therefore, the regime developed under Regulation 45/2001 would 
impact upon Kopernikus' activities to that extent. 
 
 Without having formally clarified the issue, more recent legal 
documents on GMES/Kopernikus have only fuelled the expectation that 
the future key players in the initiative and the institutional framework to 
be established for it would include one or more EU institutions. For 
instance, the Communication of 10 November 2005, aptly entitled 'From 
Concept to Reality',72 starts by reiterating the general thrust of the GMES 
project. Thus, it states: "the need for reliable and timely information has 
been underlined by increased demand. Natural and manmade 
catastrophes in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, coupled with 
increased security needs, have further reinforced the case for improved 
monitoring systems. Global to local levels of requirements have now 
been identified".73 
 
 GMES/Kopernikus is thus tasked to support a range of EU 
policies, and the Communication refers specifically to concrete examples 
like the Union's involvement in agriculture, environmental and fisheries 
monitoring, external relations such as in case of disaster and emergency 
response action, and development policies.74 The Communication further 
determines the way forward by means of defining the concepts of 'pilot 
operational services' and 'Fast Track introduction'.75  
                                                                                                                       
COM(2005) 208 final. 
72 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): From Concept to Reality, 
COM(2005) 565 final, of 10 November 2005. [Concept to Reality]. Whilst the GMES website 
makes reference to a further Decision of the Commission of 8 March 2006, pertaining to the 
establishment of a core team on GMES labelled the 'GMES Bureau', at the time of this 
writing it has not been possible to locate and access that Decision; see online: 
<http://www.gmes.info/72.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008, last updated 17 November 
2006.  
73 Concept to Reality, ibid., at 5.  
74 Ibid., at, 6-7. 
75 The focus on institutional users, notably EU institutions and national governments, as 
potential output receivers, is further reflected in the membership of the various groups 
established to develop the three fast track services. The Emergency Response Core Service 
(ERCS) Implementation Group thus comprises the Italian Civil Protection agency 
representing national EU member states' civil protection agencies, the Commission's DG's 
on Environment and External Relations respectively, the Commission's Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO) and the fire rescue service of the Czech Republic representing the civil 
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 The key role of GMES/Kopernikus in supporting EU policies, the 
involvement of many Commission Directorates-General in the pilot 
operational services and the general political leading role of the 
Commission in the effort makes it likely that an EU institution will 
function as a key entity within the operational framework for GMES. 
Moreover, the same and/or other EU institutions will also be playing 
important roles in downstream dissemination, which is where – in the 
case of VHR satellite data at least – privacy issues may start to arise. As 
such, an EU institution or body would qualify as a 'GMES data 
controller'. 
 
 Thus, the legal regime developed on the basis of the Data 
Protection Directive and further elaborated for this special case by 
Regulation 45/2001 would mean, in the context of GMES, that transfer of 
personal data for commercial purposes may not be possible.  
 
B. DIRECTIVES 97/66 AND 2002/58 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INVOLVED IN DATA HANDLING  
 
 In view of the key role telecommunication services and 
infrastructure play in today's issues of privacy and privacy-sensitive 
access to data, a special set of EC law instruments have been developed 
for the purpose. In this context, the first such instrument that dealt with 
the issue, Directive 97/66,76 focused on the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector in a 
rather comprehensive fashion. Given the prominent use of 
telecommunications infrastructure for the dissemination and distribution 
of satellite remote sensing data, this instrument of EC law is particularly 
relevant for the current analysis.  
                                                                                                                       
protection agencies in new EU member states; see online: 
<http://www.gmes.info/168.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008. The Land Monitoring Core 
Service (LMCS) Implementation Group likewise comprises the German national mapping 
agency, the Hungarian Institute of Geodesy, representing user communities in new EU 
member states, the European Topic Centre on Terrestrial Environment, the European 
Environmental Agency, and the Commission's DG's on Regional Policy respectively 
Agriculture and Rural Development; see online: <http://www.gmes.info/167.0.html>. 
accessed 28 July 2008. The Marine Core Service (MCS) Implementation Group finally 
comprises the European Association for the Global Ocean Observing System 'EuroGOOS', 
European Meteorological Offices, the Marine Board of the European Science Foundation, 
the Commission's Maritime Policy Task Force, the European Environment Agency, the 
European Maritime Safety Agency and the Commission's DG on External Relations; see 
online: <http://www.gmes.info/169.0.html>. accessed 28 July 2008. 
76 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 97/66/EC concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, [1998] O.J. L 24/1.   
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 The aim and objective of Directive 97/66 was to create rules that 
were technology-neutral, that is, they were not to dictate or discriminate 
in favor of the use of a particular type of technology. Rather, they ought 
to ensure that the same service is regulated in an equivalent manner 
irrespective of the means by which it is delivered. Directive 2002/5877 
was then drafted to replace Directive 97/66 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications 
sector in order to adapt and update the existing provisions to new and 
foreseeable developments in electronic communications services and 
technologies, notably of ICT (information and computer technology) 
convergence.  
 
 Thus, Directive 2002/58 provides for the harmonization of the 
provisions of the member states, who are required to ensure an 
equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms within 
the EU, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the 
processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector and 
to ensure the free movement of such data and electronic communications 
equipment and services within the European Union.78 The Directive 
applies to the processing of personal data specifically in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services in 
public communications networks. It seeks to provide suitable measures 
for adaptation of previous EC legal measures to developments in the 
markets and technologies for electronic communications services. It does 
this in order to provide an equal level of protection of personal data and 
privacy for users of publicly available electronic communications 
services, regardless of the technologies used.  
 
 The existing definitions of 'telecommunications services and 
networks' under Directive 97/66 were subsequently replaced in 
Directive 2002/58 by the definition 'electronic communications services 
and networks' under Article 2. This is to ensure that all different types of 
transmission services for electronic communications will be covered 
regardless of the technology used, and essentially in the same, 
technology-neutral fashion. 
 
 Moreover, four new definitions were added, of "calls", 
"communication", "traffic data", and "location data" respectively, to 
                                                     
77 EC, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, 
[2002] O.J. L 201/37. [Directive 2002/58].,  
78 Ibid., at Art. 1(1) & (2).   
2009 EUROPE AND THE 'RESOLUTION REVOLUTION': EUROPEAN LEGAL APPROACHES 837 
TO PRIVACY AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR SPACE REMOTE SENSING 
 
strengthen the common understanding of these terms and thereby 
improve the harmonized implementation of the relevant articles 
throughout the European Union.79 
 
 The provisions of these Directives thereby particularize and 
complement Directive 95/46 for the purposes of the "processing of 
personal data in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services in public communications networks 
in the Community".80 Also, these provisions provide for the protection of 
legitimate interests of legal persons: Directive 2002/58 considers legal 
persons to be persons whose interests can and should indeed be 
legitimately protected.  
 
 Confidentiality of communications including the relevant traffic 
data and the prohibition of tapping or other forms of surveillance by 
third parties are also guaranteed:81 
 
(1) Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of 
communications and the related traffic data by means of a public 
communications network and publicly available electronic 
communications services, through national legislation. In 
particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other 
kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the 
related traffic data by persons other than users, without the 
consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to 
do so in accordance with Article 15(1). This paragraph shall not 
prevent technical storage which is necessary for the conveyance of 
a communication without prejudice to the principle of 
confidentiality. 
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not affect any legally authorised recording of 
communications and the related traffic data when carried out in 
the course of lawful business practice for the purpose of providing 
evidence of a commercial transaction or of any other business 
communication. 
 
 As it is very important for data subjects to be fully informed about 
the type of data which are being processed and the purposes for which 
this is done, an explicit obligation is imposed by the Directive to inform 
                                                     
79 Ibid., at Art. 2(e), (d), (b) & (c).  
80 Ibid., at Art. 3(1).  
81 Ibid., at Art. 5, 
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subscribers of the data which are being collected.82 This empowers 
subscribers to any service involving substantial data generation and 
handling to control and, where necessary, object to ongoing data 
processing. 
 
 The impending arrival of Europe's second-generation satellite 
timing, positioning and navigation system Galileo on the European scene 
has caused necessary amendments to the existing regime.83 Not only is 
this  of interest to GMES/Kopernikus given the potential for satellite 
positioning information to enhance the precision and value of GMES 
data, it has also caused the EC to enact a new article  on location data 
other than traffic within Directive 2002/58.  It stipulates that such data:84  
 
may only be processed when they are made anonymous, or with 
the consent of the users or subscribers to the extent and for the 
duration necessary for the provision of a value added service. The 
service provider must inform the users or subscribers, prior to 
obtaining their consent, of the type of location data other than 
traffic data which will be processed, of the purposes and duration 
of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted to a 
third party for the purpose of providing the value added service. 
Users or subscribers shall be given the possibility to withdraw 
their consent for the processing of location data other than traffic 
data at any time. 
 
 The only exceptions to the principle of prior consent would be the 
use of location data by emergency services as well as the existing 
derogation for EU member states for the purposes of public and national 
security and criminal investigations.  For these purposes a reference is 
included in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 to allow member states to 
restrict the of use location data where this is necessary and 
proportionate. 
 
 Lastly, the Directive provides for clauses on technical features and 
standardization, guaranteeing that data protection considerations may 
not lead to trade and service barriers within the EU Internal Market for 
                                                     
82 Ibid., at Art. 6(4). 
83 See e.g. Frans G. von der Dunk, "Towards Monitoring Galileo: the European GNSS 
Supervisory Authority" in statu nascendi, (2006) 55 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 
100; See also Frans. G von der Dunk "Hosting Galileo Ground Stations – Liability and 
Responsibility Issues under Space Law" in Proceedings of the Fiftieth Colloquium on the Law of 
Outer Space (2008) 358.  
84 Directive 2002/58, supra note 78 at Art. 9(1). 
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terminal equipment and software and ensures that any mandatory 
requirements on terminal equipment and software to protect personal 
data and privacy may only be imposed through EC procedures.85 
 
 Exceptions to the application of the general regime of Directive 
95/46 remain possible, however. EU member states may restrict 
provisions of the Directive to safeguard public security and conduct 
criminal investigations. Moreover, such exceptions extend to situations 
"when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and 
proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national 
security (i.e., State security), defence, public security, and the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
unauthorized use of the electronic communication system, as referred to 
in Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC".86 Again, the relevance for 
satellite remote sensing activities, in particular GMES / Kopernikus, will 
be clear. 
 
 Finally, Article 1(3) of Directive 2002/58 provides for the same 
exceptions as Directive 95/46 regarding Title V and VI of the Treaty of 
the European Union, regarding public and national security and criminal 
investigations. The Directive provides for very specific obligations here, 
inter alia imposing responsibility for the security of services and 
networks on providers and obliges them to inform subscribers in case of 
residual security risks:87 
 
(1) The provider of a publicly available electronic communications 
service must take appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to safeguard security of its services, if necessary in 
conjunction with the provider of the public communications 
network with respect to network security. Having regard to the 
state of the art and the cost of their implementation, these 
measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk 
presented. 
(2) In case of a particular risk of a breach of the security of the 
network, the provider of a publicly available electronic 
communications service must inform the subscribers concerning 
such risk and, where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures 
to be taken by the service provider, of any possible remedies, 
including an indication of the likely costs involved. 
                                                     
85 Ibid., at Art. 14.  
86 Ibid., at Art. 15(1). 
87 Ibid., at Art. 4.  
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 In sum, such general obligations pertaining to the use of 
telecommunication infrastructure under Directive 2002/58 with a view 
to privacy issues will also have a fundamental impact on VHR satellite 
data downstream services and activities, in view of the almost inherent 
need for the latter to make use of such infrastructure. 
 
C. DECISIONS 2001/497 AND 2002/16 – EXTRA-EU EFFECTS OF 
DATA HANDLING 
 
 The extent to which personal data is protected outside the 
European Union, whether for privacy purposes or for other purposes, is 
fundamentally a matter for national legislation of the states where such 
protection is desired; obviously, the EU institutions cannot determine 
any applicable principles and rules outside the territories of the EU 
member states. 
 
 Nevertheless, the European Union has the competencies to deal 
with such issues to the extent that EU entities and companies, including 
notably a GMES Authority for Kopernikus, are involved in such 
dealings. Two Decisions of the European Commission are relevant in this 
respect: Decision 2001/497 on standard contractual clauses for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46,88 and 
Decision 2002/16 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to processors established in third countries, under 
Directive 95/46.89 
 
 Since most satellite remote sensing activities have a tendency of 
being of global effect, scope and application, EC law such as the 
aforementioned Decisions relating to data protection will apply even for 
data transfers outside Europe, as long as the data processing itself is 
performed under the jurisdictions of one or more EU member states.  
 
 For any satellite-data-based activities downstream of any 
European satellite operator and/or GMES Authority in these states the 
regime of Directive 95/46 continues to apply, mutatis mutandis. To the 
extent that such operators have the legal nationality of (that is place of 
incorporation and headquarters in) an EU member state, or operate from 
                                                     
88 EC, Commission Decision 497/2001/EC on standard contractual clauses for the transfer 
of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, [2001] O.J. L 181/19.  
89 EC, Commission Decision 16/2002/EC on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, 
[2002] O.J. L 6/52.  
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EU member state territory, they would be equally bound by such rules. 
The same applies to any satellite remote sensing data and/or service 
provider operating in the EU markets. This is the case even if the 
provider is non-EU in origin and conducting their operations basically 
from outside the European Union, regardless of whether they use data 
derived from European satellites or not. The aim must ultimately be to 
maintain a level playing field within the European Union. 
 
 If, however, non-EU companies not operating from EU territory 
would become customers for European satellite-derived data or 
customers for services so as to incorporate these the services the non-EU 
companies perform outside EU territory, relevant entities would have a 
'flow-down' duty to ensure that it will in no way contribute thereby to 
circumvention of this EU regime.  
 
 To this extent, the effects of the EC law regime discussed could be 
labeled as 'extra-territorial'. Obviously, if in such a case a non-EU 
customer would obtain data without any involvement of European 
satellite products or services, and handle them differently from that 
which would be allowed under the EU regime, there is – legally 
speaking – little either the GMES Authority or the Commission or even 
the EU member states could do about it. However, the burden of proof 
that the relevant authority was not able to prevent that from happening 
would lie with the authority – the GMES Authority in case of 
Kopernikus, the Commission and/or individual EU member states, as 
applicable. Of course, any such event may lead to undesirable political 
fall-out. 
 
 The extent to which this general legal framework will in practice 
affect European VHR satellite data operations and downstream activities 
can of course only be determined in fairly general terms, noting that 
even in the context of GMES / Kopernikus major uncertainties regarding 
the structural framework for operations and downstream activities still 
exist. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Comparing the two 'European approaches', it is clear that they 
come from rather different points of departure; and stay true to those. 
On the one hand, there is the legal framework developed under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe which views privacy as a rather 
fundamental human right, to be protected against all undue interference, 
including commercial ones. On the other hand, the law developed within 
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the European Community starts out from a commercial vantage point 
and tries to ensure that a level playing field with open borders exists also 
in areas where privacy concerns may come to obstruct or limit access to 
data, including VHR satellite data. 
 
 Aggravating the potential conflict between those two approaches, 
the two international organizations have a different set of states as 
members; the Council of Europe counting 47 member states altogether, 
the European Union counting 27. 
 
 Nonetheless, such potential conflicts are mitigated firstly by the 
fact that all EU member states are members of the Council of Europe. 
Secondly, even where divergence between the Council of Europe-
member states not members of the Union and those that are members of 
the Union may arise, it should be pointed out that the Community itself 
and its institutions are committed to upholding the obligations imposed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, EC law is to 
respect and, where required, even incorporate the core substance of the 
Convention's system of human rights protection into its day to day 
influence within 'Europe'.90  
 
 Therefore, within the context of EC law, the protection of the 
individual constitutes the principle whereas the free flow of information, 
deemed necessary for optimal economic and commercial development, 
constitutes the exception. This is clearly contrary to its official 
relationship being the other way round. The undue obstruction of the 
Internal Market and furtherance of commercial activities on a level 
playing field remain the primary focus of EC law, leading to 
harmonization efforts such as those discussed above. Yet, ultimately, the 
European approach to privacy issues in terms of data is based on the 
protection of the individual as the most fundamental parameter.  
 
 This general conclusion obviously also includes satellite remote 
sensing data, whether under the European Convention on Human 
Rights or in the framework of EC law. Of particular interest in this 
respect is the GMES/Kopernikus initiative, which is to be not only 
a(nother) flagship of European cooperation in space, with the 
Commission as the political driving factor and ESA as the technical 
coordinator, but may also give rise to an enormous boost of satellite data 
and related activities downstream, as regards a variety of applications 
                                                     
90 Cf. Art. 6(1), in particular (2), Treaty on European Union; also e.g. R.P. Folsom, Principles of 
European Union Law, (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2005) 57-59. 
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and services. In this sense, GMES/Kopernikus may well act as a catalyst 
also for increasing private activities at the level of generation of data by 
satellites, further to greater involvement in the downstream areas. If 
VHR satellite data are, indeed, going to be a major element in this 
development, then ever more privacy issues will rear their heads, 
whether at the individual or at the company level. 
 
 What does the above analysis, finally, mean for Athos and our 
German businessman? At this point in time, the international freedom to 
undertake satellite remote sensing activities, which was at the basis of 
the latter's interest, is (still) relatively undisputed. However, with the 
increasing advent of VHR satellite data on the scene, especially as part of 
the broader context of Google Earth's adventures and (other) 
Geographical Information Systems, it cannot be excluded that also on the 
international level consensus would increasingly be called for by at least 
some major stakeholders that the unfettered usage of space-borne data 
should be curbed. And whilst on the larger political level limitations to 
freedom of information-gathering will continue to be strongly resisted 
by the major space-faring nations, when it comes to the privacy of 
individuals and companies the outcome of such a discussion might not 
be a foregone conclusion. 
 
 At the other end, the Greek authorities will, for the time being, 
continue to be able to use their sovereign rights even within the context 
of EC law for the protection of the interests of Athos, as they did vis-à-vis 
the German businessman. The current exceptions to the application of 
unfettered free-commerce regulations, within the current set of relevant 
EC instruments, leave ample room for that. Indeed, as long as the Greek 
authorities refrain from discrimination in allowing a local businessman 
to do what the German one was not allowed to do, there is little chance 
this would change.  
 
 The only option left to the German businessman, therefore, would 
be to offer his satellite pictures to those interested who are outside the 
reach of Greek sovereign jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it would be prudent 
of him to ensure that any authorities dealing with such a matter would 
not support the Greek view and uphold relevant obstacles within their 
jurisdiction as well. Whether that leaves enough of a business case to be 
still of interest to him is another matter; any potential intrusion into the 
holy atmosphere at Athos will be removed far enough from the scene 
itself to justify limiting the internationally recognized freedom of 
information gathering for the purpose. 
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 Even though such an outcome is the result of a perhaps an 
unnecessarily complicated construction – the alignment of two European 
approaches, on top of the international and national regimes relevant for 
privacy issues stemming from the usage of VHR satellite data – it does 
reflect the general European attitude that a fair balance has to be struck 
between commercial opportunities and the individual's rights to privacy. 
In other words, the alignment of these two European approaches has 
caused the international regime, which enshrines the freedom of space 
activities such as information gathering by satellite, to meet any given 
particular national regime in the middle. National sovereignty it 
therefore utilized for the purpose of preserving 'privacy'.   
